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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JOEY WILLIAMS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17330 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with the crime of 
aggravated robbery pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 
76-6-302. In a jury trial conducted in the Third Judicial 
District Court before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, the 
appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of 
robbery, a second degree felony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with the aggravated 
robbery of a service station attendant by the use of a knife 
or facsimile of a knife pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 76-6-302. In a jury trial before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, the appellant was convicted of the lesser included 
offense of robbery, a second degree felony, and was sentenced 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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to serve a term of confinement at the Utah State Prison of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years. This sentence 
was to be served concurrently with the sentence the appellant 
was serving at the time of conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a judgment and order affirming the 
appellant's conviction in the lower court, 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of Saturday, November 24, 1979, 
Mike Weaver was observed shoplifting a leather coat from the 
z.c.M.I. store located in the Cottonwood Mall (T 483, 484). 
Weaver was arrested, searched, and taken to the store security 
office by security personnel where the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office was notified (T. 484). Deputy John Acomb was 
dispatched to pick up weaver and return him to the Holladay 
Substation of the sheriff's department (T. 222). Enroute to 
the substation, during a conversation with Weaver, Deputy 
Acomb learned that Weaver had been recently paroled from the 
Utah State Prison (T. 223). Apprehensive about returning to 
the prison as a result of the shoplifting charge, Weaver 
expressed the desire to cooperate with authorities to prevent 
a robbery or apprehend the participants of a robbery which was 
already scheduled to occur later that evening (T. 223, 291). 
-2-
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During the interview with sheriff's deputies, Weaver noted 
that the appellant had called him earlier in the day wanting 
to commit an armed robbery and to discuss plans for the 
robbery that evening (T. 143-145). Weaver, a proven reliable 
police informant, then consented to call the appellant from 
the police station and further discuss plans for the robbery 
(T. 313, 314, 144). During this recorded conversation, Weaver 
and the appellant discussed the vehicle and weapons to be 
used, as well as the types of victims who were the easiest 
targets (T. 144, 445). As a result of the conversation, it 
was determined that no firearms would be used, that Weaver 
would use his vehicle to pick up the appellant at his parents' 
address, and that the robbery would be perpetrated (T. 19, 20, 
316). 
Before Weaver left the police substation to drive 
to the appellant's residence, officers instructed him to 
prevent any threat to life at all costs (T. 21). Police 
officers also instructed Weaver to drive straight through a 
designated intersection if the robbery had taken place, or to 
turn at that intersection if the crime had not been committed 
(T. 100). At the conclusion of these instructions, weaver we 
then released to drive to another meeting point where police 
would give him final instructions (T. 100). Weaver was told 
to abort the robbery if a firearm was involved, and if 
possible, to inform the police when the location of the 
-3-
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robbery became known to him (T. 166). Weaver was also 
instructed that in order to keep his identity as an informer 
secret, he would be allowed to escape on foot after the 
vehicle was stopped by police (T. 21). Weaver then proceeded 
to drive to the address given him by the appellant during the 
earlier telephone conversation (T. 167). 
Upon picking up the appellant, weaver noticed that 
Williams had brought a household paring knife to be used as a 
weapon (T. 22). Weaver and the appellant proceeded to drive 
around in search of a place to rob (T. 23). This search led 
them to Holiday Oil, a service station located approximately 
two miles from appellant's residence (T. 23, 27). Weaver and 
the appellant arrived at the station just as the attendant was 
preparing to close the business (T. 83). As the attendant 
returned from emptying the garbage, the appellant approached 
him at the door of the station and informed him that "my 
partner has a gun and this is a holdup" (T. 83). The 
attendant was uncertain that a gun was actually involved (T. 
89). The three men then entered the station where the 
attendant was forced to sit in a chair while the appellant 
took the attendant's wallet and money from the cash register 
(T. 86, 280, 297). The appellant and Weaver then exited the 
station area, entered their car, and sped away (T. 88, 170). 
A short time later, a police surveillance vehicle observed 
-4-
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Weaver's automobile travel straight through the designated 
intersection, indicating that the robbery had taken place (T. 
106). The officers pursued the vehicle which eventually 
pulled to the side of the road and stopped (T. 107). As 
Weaver stopped the car, he jumped out and escaped on foot as 
planned (T. 107). The appellant was apprehended and taken 
back to the service station where the attendant identified him 
as one of the robbers (T. 90, 91). 
At trial, Mike Weaver testified that he was 
returned to the prison in July of 1980 for violating his 
parole (T. 28-29). While there, weaver was approached and 
threatened by the appellant on several occasions (T. 29, 32). 
At one point, Weaver was beaten by unidentified assailants (T. 
33). The appellant also coerced weaver into signing a hand-
written statement saying in effect that Weaver had committed 
the robbery by himself and that the appellant was only a 
hitchhiker who was picked up just prior to the commission of 
the crime (T. 32-34). weaver also testified that defense 
counsel and an investigator employed by counsel presented him 
with a typewritten statement for his signature (T. 34-35). 
This statement was presented to Weaver at the prison without 
the knowledge or approval of the prosecutor, and in the 
absence of a certified shorthand reporter (T. 35, 42-43). At 
the time this statement was signed, Weaver did not have the 
-5-
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benefit of counsel, nor was he placed under oath (T. 35, 43). 
weaver was also not allowed to keep a copy of the statement 
(T. 39-40). Later, because of the threats and the coercive 
environment to which Weaver was subjected, he was granted 
protective custody (T. 36, 128, 209, 221). 
In his opening statement at the trial, the 
prosecutor noted that while Weaver had been incarcerated in 
the State Prison, he had been threatened by several inmates 
including the appellant (T. 7). He also noted that because of 
this precarious position, Weaver was coerced into signing a 
statement exculpating the appellant from criminal liability 
(T. 7). The prosecutor stated further that Weaver would 
testify to the signing of the statement which was in the 
custody of defense counsel (T. 7). Defense counsel interposed 
no contemporaneous objection, and in fact did not mention the 
prosecutor's opening statement until some time later, prior to 
the cross examination of weaver (T. 41). 
At that time, out of the presence of the jury, 
defense counsel moved for a mistrial, not on the ground that 
counsel's integrity had been impugned, but on the ground that 
the prosecutor, through his opening statement and through the 
direct examination of Weaver, had informed the jury that the 
appellant had been previously convicted of a felony (T. 42). 
The court thereafter reconvened in chambers to discuss the 
-6-
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matter further, and eventually denied the motion for a 
mistrial (T. 44). In chambers, defense counsel made his first 
motion to withdraw as counsel on the ground that he was so 
upset he could not continue to competently represent the 
appellant (T. 44). The court likewise denied ·the motion to 
withdraw (T. 45). The trial proceeded in normal fashion (T. 
4 5- 46 ) • 
The second day of the trial, September 8, 1980, 
began with the trial judge excusing the jury in order to hear 
a series of defense motions (T. 118). Defense counsel moved 
for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor "introduced 
evidence" in his opening statement (T. 118). This alleged 
"incompetent evidence" was purported to be the prosecutor's 
comment made during his opening statement that Weaver had 
signed a statement under duress and coercion, exculpating the 
appellant, which statement was in the custody of defense 
counsel (T. 119). Defense counsel then asserted that he 
should be allowed to withdraw as counsel on the grounds that 
his character had been discredited (T. 121). He alleged that 
his credibility could be restored only if he were able to call 
the p~osecutor to testify and withdraw as defense c~~~" 0 ~ 
himself, in order to testify to the events surrounding the 
signing of the statement by Weaver at the prison (T. 123-124), 
Defense counsel concluded his argument by again moving for a 
-7-
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mistrial on the ground that his client could not obtain a fair 
trial (T. 126). After a brief response by the prosecutor, the 
court, referring to a meeting held in chambers on the subject, 
denied the motion for a mistrial (T. 129). 
On the subject of calling the prosecutor as a 
defense witness and allowing defense counsel to withdraw and 
likewise become a defense witness, defense counsel stated 
expressly that he was not going to testify (T. 125). The 
court thereafter denied defense counsel's request to call the 
prosecutor as a witness when the prosecutor objected on the 
grounds of relevancy (T. 136). Defense counsel also noted 
that a curative instruction may be required concerning the 
"inadmissible evidence" mentioned in the prosecutor's opening 
statement (T. 132). The court replied that such an 
instruction would be given upon counsel's request; however, no 
such instruction was ever requested (T. 132-133). 
Later in the trial, after the State had rested its 
case, the defense called weaver as a witness (T. 202). 
Defense counsel questioned Weaver in depth about prior felony 
convictions (T. 203-209). During this time, defense counsel 
elicited information concerning crimes with which Weaver was 
charged but which were never brought to trial, and for which 
no conviction was obtained (T. 208). The entire line of 
questioning took place over the prosecutor's continuing 
objection (T. 206-207). 
-8-
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Therafter, defense counsel called and examined 
witness James Miller (T. 219). During direct examination, the 
witness testified that he was currently a resident of the Utah 
State Prison, having been convicted of robbery and kidnapping 
(T. 219-220). On cross examination, the witness was asked 
"What did you rob?" (T. 222). Defense counsel objected to the 
question stating that the prosecutor was entitled to ask only 
the nature and year of the conviction (T. 222). The 
prosecutor responded to the objection by moving to strike the 
previous improper examination of Weaver concerning previous 
charges and convictions, which was allowed pursuant to a side 
bar stipulation (T. 222). The prosecutor also observed that 
the defense counsel, by the improper examination of Weaver, 
had "opened the door respecting the parameters" of questioni~ 
(T. 222). The court overruled the objection and the witness 
replied that he had beaten two persons and had taken their 
driver's licenses and one of their wallets (T. 222). The 
prosecutor then asked the witness who he had kidnapped (T. 
222). The witness replied that he had kidnapped an eleven-
year-old child (T. 223). Although no contemporaneous 
objection was made to this question, an objection was 
interposed to a later question asking why the witness had 
committed the crime (T. 223). The witness refused to answer 
the question stating that the reason for the kidnapping was 
"beside the point" (T. 223). 
-9-
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Beginning the third day Of trial, the court 
convened in chambers and discussed the matter of the 
parameters of the direct and cross examination of witnesses 
who had been convicted of felonies (T. 350). The prosecutor 
asked that the record reflect the contents of a discussion 
that took place at the side bar (T. 350). After brief 
comments were heard as to the contents of the side bar 
discussion, the court summarized the discussion for the 
record: 
And after the discussion we concluded 
that the Court was of the opinion that 
the examination by the defense was going 
beyond the scope permitted. That the 
State stipulated to it, and I believe I 
stated that on the record, the State 
agreed to it. But with the understanding 
that if you did go into it the door would 
be open and the State could also have the 
same latitude. That is my best 
recollection. 
(T. 353). The court then allowed the prosecutor to call a 
rebuttal witness before counsel's arguments began (T. 354). 
Immediately prior to allowing counsel to argue their cases, 
and prior to giving the instructions to the jury, the court 
noted that the evidence had been completed (T. 357). The 
court then reiterated a note previously stated to the jury 
that counsel's arguments were not evidence, but rather 
constituted their attempt to tie the evidence together under 
their particular point of view (T. 357). 
-10-
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During the prosecutor's argument, reference was 
made to "what the impact would have been had Mr. Cassins Clart 
himself been injured" (T. 361). Although an objection to this 
comment was interposed, the court overruled the objection 
stating that the comment was proper under the offense charged 
(T. 361). 
After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict, 
finding the appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
robbery (T. 367). 
commented: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REFERENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS 
OPENING STATEMENT TO THE FACT THAT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD CUSTODY OF A 
STATEMENT SIGNED BY THE STATE'S CHIEF 
WITNESS EXCULPATING THE APPELLANT FROM 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WAS PROPER WHERE THE 
WITNESS WAS EXPECTED TO TESTIFY 
CONCERNING THE STATEMENT, THE REFERENCE 
WAS MADE IN GOOD FAITH, AND NO PREJUDICE 
RESULTED FROM THE COMMENT. 
During his opening statement, the prosecutor 
Bear in mind, also, that Mr. weaver 
was brought from the State Prison this 
morning, and will return to prison at the 
-11-
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conclusion of this case. Bear in mind, 
also, that while Mr. Weaver was 
incarcerated at the State Prison, he was 
in a rather precarious situation since he 
is now a state witness. He has had 
several threats made to him from prison 
inmates, including Mr. Williams, who 
threatened him if he was to testify. He 
was at one point coerced into signing a 
statement which would indicate that Mr. 
Williams was not involved in the crime. 
Bear in mind that he did that under 
duress and coercion at the time because 
of the circumstance he was in. He will 
testify to the fact that he did sign this 
particular statement. This statement at 
the present time is in custody of defense 
counsel, and I have nothing previous to 
that statement at this point in time. 
(T. 7). Defense counsel interposed no contemporaneous 
objection to the above comment he now assails. At the end of 
the opening statement, defense counsel noted that he had a 
motion to make out of the presence of the jury, but would 
reserve it for a later, more convenient time (T. 11). After 
direct examination of Weaver, the motion was heard out of the 
presence of the jury. Counsel moved for a mistrial on the 
ground that the prosecutor "in both his opening statement and 
through the testimony of Mr. warner, has elicited evidence now 
before the jury that Mr. Williams was in prison at the time 
the relationship [between Weaver and Williams] was first 
formed (T. 41). In response, the prosecutor noted that since 
a notice of entrapment had been filed by the appellant, 
appellant's relationship to Weaver and the fact that appellant 
-12-
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was on a work release program at the time of the robbery were 
certainly relevant (T. 42). It was not until this point, out 
of the presence of the jury, that counsel took offense to the 
prosecutor's response to his (defense counsel's) motion for a 
mistrial which had absolutely no connection with the alleged 
"attack" on the integrity of appellant's counsel in the 
prosecutor's opening statement, and which was no more than an 
appropriate comment on the anticipated testimony of the 
prosecutor's own witness. Counsel then moved for permission 
to withdraw from the case on the ground that becauEe he was 
emotionally upset, he could not effectively represent his 
client (T. 44). The court denied both the motion for mistrial 
and the motion to withdraw (T. 44-45). 
Not only did appellant fail to contemporaneously 
object to the prosecutor's comment, he also failed to object 
when the circumstances surrounding the signing of the 
statement were elicited on direct examination of Mr. Weaver 
(T. 34-36, 39-40). The only objections interposed at all 
during this line of questioning were: 1) to the witness' 
conclusion as to why he was asked to sign the statement 
(objection sustained); and 2) to the witness' comment as to 
what the public defender's investigator asked him to de 
(objection sustained) (T. 39). Again, at no point did the 
appellant object to the opening comments of the prosecutor or 
the 
-13-
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testimony by Weaver concerning the statement signed by Weaver 
at the prison on the grounds asserted in appellant's brief. 
The only two objections interposed at all were sustained on 
the grounds of conclusiveness of the answer and hearsay (T. 
39-40). Furthermore, when appellant's counsel moved for a 
mistrial, the basis asserted then was far removed from the 
alleged basis proffered in appellant's brief. In such a case, 
appellant cannot be heard to complain on different grounds on 
appeal. In the case of State v. Long, 580 P.2d 1181, 1182 
(Ariz. 1978), the Arizona Supreme Court was faced with an 
allegation of error committed in one of the trial court's jury 
instructions. At trial the defendant objected to the 
instruction on grounds different from those urged on appeal. 
Discussing the doctrine of waiver in this context, the court 
stated: 
However, raising one objection at trial 
does not preserve another objection on 
appeal •••• Furthermore, an error in 
giving instructions is waived unless 
timely objection is made in the trial 
court •••• Because appellant failed to 
raise the objection at trial that she now 
urges on appeal, the objection is waived. 
Any comment by the prosecutor which could be 
construed as an affront to counsel's integrity only by the 
wildest stretch of the imagination occurred in chambers or in 
the courtroom out of the presence of the jury. The appellant 
thereby suffered absolutely no prejudice. 
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The result of appellant's failure to appropriately 
and contemporaneously object to the comments and rulings he 
now alleges were erroneous and prejudicial is a waiver of the 
right to present those issues to this Court. Such objections 
are required to properly preserve issues for appeal. See Ru~ 
4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 46 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Failure to properly preserve issues for 
appeal requires the operation of the doctrine of waiver as 
subscribed to by this Court in Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968 
(Utah 1968), and more recently in Andrews v. Morris, Utah, 607 
P.2d 816 (1980) and Pierre v. Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 812 
(1980). The appellant compounded this waiver by failing to 
request any type of curative instruction. This failure, in 
itself, requires a ruling that the appellant has waived the 
issue on appeal. The court, in People v. Beivelman, 447 P.2d 
913, 921 (Cal. 1968), stated with respect to improper remarks 
in opening statements, improper examination, or improper 
argument, that "Hence, if he [the defendant] is silent or 
merely objects or makes the assignment of misconduct but did 
not request an admonition, he cannot complain on appeal." In 
the present case, the appellant almost met this burden, but~ 
the end failed to request any type of curative admonition ev~ 
though the Court offered to give such an instruction. 
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Mr. Bugden: We are going to have to get a curative 
instruction as to the inadmissible evidence 
that is before the Court. 
The Court: If you request the instruction. I would 
indicate to you I think it is very unwise. I 
think it is unnecessary. But if you requested 
it I would probably give it just because you 
asked for it. 
(T. 132-133). Appellant's counsel failed to take advantage of 
the court's offer by omitting any request for an instruction. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the 
waiver doctrine will not be allowed to operate where an 
appellant demonstrates "cause" for his failure to comply with 
a state's procedural rule and actual prejudice resulting from 
the alleged error. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
The appellant demonstrates neither cause nor actual prejudice. 
Certainly, since counsel was present with the appellant at all 
times during the trial, there can be no reason for the failure 
to contemporaneously object. Likewise, because of the quality 
and quantity of evidence, as well as the fact that the 
appellant admitted committing the robbery (T. 277), no 
miscarriage of justice and consequently no prejudice resulted 
from the failure to object in a timely manner. See United 
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). 
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On September 8, 1980, court convened for the second 
day of trial. The jury was again excused in order for 
appellant's counsel to present several motions (T. 118). At 
that time, appellant renewed his motion for a new trial on the 
basis that the prosecutor introduced "incompetent evidence" in 
his opening statement, and accused appellant's counsel of 
"tampering with a witness" (T. 119). In response, the 
prosecutor noted that: 
I don't recall anything in the opening 
statement that I in any way besmirched 
Mr. Bugden. I certainly have the right 
to refer to evidence solicited. I don't 
have to sit
0
around here and wait for 
defense counsel to spring a surprise 
statement on me with respect to a case, 
particularly when I have information that 
has been made available to me just prior 
to coming in here [to trial) that 
indicates that Mr. Weaver did make a 
statement that is inconsistent. 
(T. 127). The court correspondingly denied the motion for a 
mistrial stating: 
(T. 130). 
The court does deny the motion as far as 
a mistrial is concerned. The court 
doesn't want to make further comment 
except this, that we discussed this 
matter last Friday, the court knows what 
was said, and I say knows, I recall 
somewhat. I do not feel there is 
anything on the record there that is 
prejudicial as far as the character of 
defense counsel anyway, and I denied the 
motion last Friday. There is nothing new 
before me today to make me change my 
mind. And I again deny the motion. 
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A review of the comment made in the opening statement by the 
prosecutor supports the comments made by the court in denying 
the motion for mistrial and the prosecutor's response to the 
motion. At no time was counsel's name mentioned, nor was 
there mention of any impropriety or unethical. conduct on 
behalf of appellant's counsel. Any possible suggestions of 
impropriety occurred out of the presence of the jury or in 
chamber consultations during recesses. 
Furthermore, case law overwhelmingly supports the 
view that the appellant cannot prevail on this point. Since 
the opening statement is essentially an outline of the 
information and evidence which counsel will present in support 
of his case, at the time an opening statement is given, no 
facts have been proven and no rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence have been made. Therefore, it is a widely accepted 
practice that "Counsel may state what he expects the witness 
will testify if the witness is going to testify." Hall v. 
State, 225 S.E. 2d 705, 707 (Ga. App. 1976). This follows 
closely the reasoning expressed by the Supreme Court of Kansas 
which stated: 
This court has consistently held that a 
prosecuting attorney is allowed 
reasonable latitude in stating to the 
jury the facts he proposes to prove ••.• 
It is only when the prosecutor acts in 
bad faith and substantial prejudice 
results that appellate courts act. 
State v. Jackson, Kan., 565 P.2d 278, 284 (1977). 
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Correspondingly, the controlling rule was stated by the court 
in the case of Gladden v. Frazier, 388 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 
1968). There the court was faced with a situation where the 
prosecutor in his opening statement commented in considerable 
detail on the evidence he intended to present and the 
witnesses who would testify to that evidence. In one ins ta nee 
he named a witness who was expected to testify to the 
commission of the crime, and thereafter recited what the 
testimony would be. When the witness was eventually called~ 
the stand, he refused to answer the prosecutor's questions 
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal, 
the court rejected appellant's claim of prejudicial error 
resulting from the prosecutor's opening statement by holding 
that: 
The controlling question should be the 
good faith or lack of good faith of 
counsel in saying what he said in his 
opening statement and the likelihood that 
the opening statement was unfairly 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
388 F.2d at 779. In the instant case, not only did the 
prosecutor make proper mention in his opening statement of the 
testimony he expected from a named witness, but the testimony 
expected was actually produced without any contemporaneous 
objection made by appellant's counsel. Furthermore, 
appellant's counsel was afforded unlimited cross examination 
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of the witness, Mr. Weaver, and later called him as a witness 
for the defense. Consequently, the appellant was in no way 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's comment in his opening 
statement. 
Moreover, since the testimony given by Weaver 
concerned only the physical and emotional environment of 
duress surrounding the signing of the statement, introduction 
of the statement itself was not necessary in order to make the 
prosecutor's comment proper. However, even if introduction of 
the statement had been necessary, the comment would still have 
been proper. In the case of Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d 
1083, 1085 (10th Cir. 1968), the court stated: 
Appellant moved for a mistrial contending 
that the evidence did not sustain a 
prejudicial opening statement made by the 
government. The law does not require 
that opening trial statements be 
completely supported by evidence 
introduced at trial. Such a rule, 
rigidly enforced, would effectively 
eliminate opening remarks and deprive the 
jury of a very useful outline of the 
trial as the attorneys expect it to 
unfold •.•• The decision is 
discretionary and is for the trial judge. 
In adopting the above rationale, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
stated in People v. Jacobs, Colo., 499 P.2d 615 (1972) that: 
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We adhere to the general rule that error 
cannot ordinarily be predicated upon an 
opening statement of the prosecuting 
attorney as to what he expects to prove, 
where, for some reason he later fails to 
support some part of that statement, 
unless the unsupported portion of this 
statement was made in bad faith and was 
manifestly prejudicial. • Thus, 
absent an affirmative showing of 
prejudice as bad faith on the part of 
counsel making the statement, the 
decision of the trial judge controlling 
such remarks will not ordinarily be 
disturbed. 
499 P.2d at 617. While the appellant has not shown the 
prosecutor's remark to be improper or prejudicial, and no 
showing of bad faith has been made, should this Court find 
error, the error was cured by the trial court's admonitions 
and instructions to the jury. 
Immediately prior to instructing the jury on the 
applicable law and after both parties had rested their cases, 
the court noted: 
At this time, members of the jury, that 
does complete the evidence in the case, 
and as I indicated to you last night it 
now becomes the Court's responsibility to 
instruct you on the law in this matter, 
after which both counsel will have an 
opportunity to argue the law and the 
facts to you, the purpose of that 
argument being to persuade you as far as 
their position is concerned. And of 
course, as I stated at the outset, what 
they say is not evidence, but they will 
tie the evidence together to give you 
information as to their particular view. 
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(T. at 357) (emphasis added). Although the court made this 
statement with particular reference to the closing arguments 
of counsel, the inference communicated by the court is that at 
some earlier point in time, probably at the beginning of 
trial, a similar admonition was given. In further 
amelioration of any error, the court made appropriate mention 
of the law and procedure of the admitting of evidence, and the 
jury's role in the trial. In instruction number six, the 
court recited that: 
You are not to consider any evidence 
offered but not admitted, nor any 
evidence stricken out by the court; as to 
any question to which an objection was 
sustained, you must not conjecture as to 
what the answer might have been or as to 
the reason for the objection. 
(R. 90). In instructions numbers nine and ten, the court 
stated among other things that the jury was the exclusive 
finder of fact and weigher of the evidence (R. 93, 94). Such 
instructions and admonitions were more than sufficient to 
render harmless any alleged impropriety in the opening 
statement. 
The court, in State v. Bowie, 580 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Ariz. 1978), concurred with this point of view. In that 
case, the prosecutor, in his opening statement, described the 
defendant's lewd and lascivious acts committed against a 
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four-year-old victim. Later, this victim was found to be 
incompetent to testify. The appellant moved for a mistrial ~ 
the basis of alleged prejudice resulting from evidence 
described in the statement but not produced at trial. 
Regarding the trial court's instructions to the jury, the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated that: 
Any possible prejudice from the opening 
statement was overcome by the court's 
cautionary instructions that evidence did 
not come from the attorneys and that the 
verdict must be determined only by 
reference to the evidence. 
The two cases referred to by appellant in support 
of his cause are either inapposite to, and distinguishable 
from, the instant case, or supportive of the respondent's 
view. In Woodmansee v. Stoneman, 344 A.2d 26 (Vt. 1975), the 
defense objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of prior 
consistent statements which were outlined in the prosecutor's 
opening statement. On appeal, the state argued the propriety 
of the statements' admission on the ground that prior 
consistent statements are admissible where a witness has been 
impeached. In the present case, no prior consistent 
statements were used or mentioned. Also, unlike Woodmansee, 
no contemporaneous objections were interposed. 
In Baker v. State, 33 N.W. 52 (Wis. 1887), the 
appellant's conviction was affirmed after the court noted 
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that counsel should be given broad latitude in their 
statements, and where questions arise, the trial court's 
discretionary ruling is respected absent any abuse of 
discretion. 
In the present case, the record reveals that the 
comment made by the prosecutor with respect to the fact that a 
statement was signed by witness Weaver in reality contained no 
reference to appellant's counsel, and in no way impugned the 
credibility of counsel. Moreover, complaints of the appellant 
are not properly before this Court where the appellant failed 
to contemporaneously object in the lower court on the grounds 
presented in this appeal. Furthermore, the appellant makes no 
demonstration of actual prejudice resulting from the comment. 
The discussions and motions for mistrial were heard outside 
the presence of the jury. In the absence of any reference to 
appellant's counsel's name or insinuation of a lack of 
integrity, it cannot be assumed that prejudice resulted. 
Likewise, the comment cannot be viewed as the 
introduction of incompetent evidence. The comment contained 
no reference to the processes or manner by which the statement 
was obtained, nor was any reference made to the language of 
the statement. The comment, which simply mentioned the 
statement in passing, was well within the realm of proper 
comment by the prosecutor who is allowed wide latitude in 
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outlining the witnesses and their expected testimony to the 
members of the jury panel. Nor was the comment left to stand 
alone or unsupported. During direct examination, witness 
Weaver testified to the environment of duress at the prison 
which resulted in the signing of the statement. Moreover, 
Weaver was subject to a full and rigorous period of cross 
examination. In view of this entire courtroom scenario, the 
appellant was not in any way prejudiced by this occurrence 
properly commented upon by the prosecutor. 
POINT II 
SINCE THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE IN HIS 
OPENING STATEMENT TO AN INCONSISTENT 
STATEMENT SIGNED BY THE STATE'S CHIEF 
WITNESS DID NOT DISCREDIT DEFENSE 
COUNSEL, THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO TESTIFY 
AND TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTOR TO TESTIFY, 
WHERE THE PROFFERED TESTIMONY COULD HAVE 
BEEN OBTAINED FROM OTHER PERSONS. 
In responding to Points II and III of appellant's 
brief, it is important to note the comment made by the 
prosecutor in his opening statement, which is proffered as the 
basis of appellant's allegations. 
He has had several threats made to him 
from prison inmates including Mr. 
Williams who threatened him if he was to 
testify. He was at one point in time 
coerced into signing a statement which 
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would indicate that Mr. Williams was not 
involved in a crime. Bear in mind that 
he did that under duress and coercion at 
the time because of the circumstance he 
was in. He will testify to the fact that 
he did sign this particular statement. 
This statement at the present time is in 
the custody of defense counsel, anQ I 
have nothing previous to that statement 
at this point in time. 
(T. 7). At no time is the name of appellant's counsel 
mentioned, nor is there any allegation of impropriety on the 
part of counsel in the manner by which the statement was 
obtained. Likewise, no mention is made of counsel's 
investigator nor of visits made to the prison. It is 
important to remember also that the witness, weaver, testified 
in support of the above comment without objection from 
appellant's counsel. Note also that counsel conducted cross 
examination of the witness and introduced witnesses to counter 
Weaver's testimony. In view of these facts, it was simply 
unnecessary for appellant's counsel or the prosecutor to 
withdraw and testify in the case, particularly where no 
contemporaneous objection on the grounds now alleged was made 
either during the opening statement or direct examination. 
The first reference made to a motion to withdraw is 
found during the discussion of a motion for a mistrial out of 
the presence of the jury (T. 44). There, appellant's counsel 
moves to withdraw on the basis that he could no longer 
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effectively represent his client; he makes no mention of 
withdrawing in order to testify. After the motion was denied, 
appellant's counsel conducted the cross examination of several 
witnesses. Not until the second day of the trial, four days 
after the first day of trial, did counsel move to withdraw on 
the grounds now asserted. At that time, counsel also 
expressed his intention to call the prosecutor as a defense 
witness (T. 121). In response to counsel's motion, the court 
stated: 
I don't think there is a need for either 
one of you testifying. I think all you 
are doing, Mr. Bugden, to be perfectly 
frank with you, is stirring this matter 
up and creating a want for something 
there that is just not there. There has 
not been the prejudice on this record of 
which you are referring to. 
(T. 132). Appellant's counsel later disposed of the present 
issue in a colloquy with the court: 
The Court: That is my understanding. So if you call yourself 
as a witness, then you are doing that of your own 
choice. 
Mr. Bugden: Well, I am doing it because the Court won't 
declare a mistrial. 
The Court: No you are not. You are calling yourself as a 
witness. What you are saying is that you will 
not argue the case, is that correct counsel? 
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Mr. Bugden: Well, that is what the canons require. 
The court: Well, then I want to get this clear. rs that 
what you intend to not argue the case? 
Mr. Bugden: I haven't decided, Your Honor, if r am going 
The court: 
to testify. I have decided that Mr. Christensen 
is. 
My question to you is this--
Mr. Bugden: I am not going to testify. 
(T. 135) (Emphasis added). Simply stated, there was no reason 
for the court to allow appellant's counsel to withdraw in 
order to testify since appellant's counsel had decided not to 
testify. This issue was rendered moot by appellant's counsel 
in the lower court. 
Courts in general are hesitant to allow 
participating counsel to be called as a witness since "The 
role of advocate and witness should be kept separated and an 
advocate should be called as a witness only in circumstances 
of the utmost necessity." Cavaness v. State, Okl. Cir., 581 
P.2d 475, 478 (1978). Such necessity did not exist in the 
present case. It is important to note that the details of the 
signing of the statement by Weaver and the alleged 
insinuations of misconduct were never presented to the jury. 
Had the jury been informed of the manner in which the 
statement was obtained by defense counsel, the necessity of 
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further evidence of the details and telephone conversations 
might be arguable. However, even in that event, the testimony 
of either counsel would not have been required. Appellant's 
counsel could easily have called as a witness the investiga~r 
who actually obtained the statement (T. 119). Counsel could 
also have called John Hill, who was also apparently connected 
with the signing of the statement (T. 121). As to any 
information concerning Weaver's initial contact with counsel 
and Weaver's prison status at the time of the contact, Weaver 
himself could have testified to those events on direct 
examination by appellant's counsel. As to Weaver's prison 
status at the time of initial contact, Beverly Tisher, 
custodian of prison records, could have provided the necessary 
testimony. All of the necessary information could have been 
obtained without the testimony of the prosecutor or the 
appellant's counsel. 
In the present case, counsel's proffered showing of 
the necessity of calling the prosecutor as a defense witness 
was insufficient to compel the court to rule in counsel's 
favor over the objection of the prosecutor. In Riboni v. 
District Court in and for the Tenth Judicial District, Colo., 
586 P.2d (1978), the court held that: 
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To disqualify a prosecuting 
attorney, the defendant has the burden of 
establishing facts sufficient to persuade 
the trial court that he probably will be 
denied a fair trial if the prosecuting 
attorney is not removed .••• The mere 
fact that the defense intends to call the 
prosecutor as a witness does not, without 
more, dispose of the question. 
586 P.2d at 11. In the present case, the appellant has not 
even approached this level of proof. Indeed, it is difficult 
to imagine how the appellant was denied a fair trial in view 
of his admission that he committed the robbery: 
Mr. Bugden: You did the robbery, didn't you? 
Mr. Williams: Yeah. Yes, I did. 
(T. 277). 
The Court, in Riboni. also stated the reason for 
its holding was that: 
Every prosecutor who participates 
directly in interviewing and otherwise 
investigating his cases subjects himself 
to the risk of being called as a witness. 
But to allow opposing counsel the 
unfettered option of removing any 
prosecutor who has personal knowledge of 
any material fact in the case might well 
result in restricting the prosecution 
function to the ill-prepared. 
586 ?.2d at 11. Since no "material fact" was involved in the 
present case, the above stated reason looms as a more ominous 
danger. 
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Not only must the appellant demonstrate that he 
will be denied a fair trial in order to prevail, his burden is 
compounded by the fact that the issue is addressed to the 
discretion of the trial court. In State v. Hegervorst, 566 
P.2d 828 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977), the court stated: 
Nevertheless, a trial court has 
discretion respecting the examination of 
witnesses and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may refuse to allow a 
witness to take the stand. courts are 
reluctant to allow attorneys to be called 
as witnesses in trials in which they are 
advocates. When a trial court refuses to 
allow a prosecutor to be called as a 
witness for the defense, the appellate 
issue is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion. 
566 P.2d at 834. In light of the fact that the evidence 
sought to be obtained from the prosecutor's testimony could 
have been obtained from a number of other individuals, it 
cannot be said that the lower court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow appellant's counsel to call the prosecutor 
as a witness. Likewise, it is clear that where evidence of 
the details of the signing of the statement were not before 
the jury, the appellant was not denied his right to the 
confrontation of witnesses under Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
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POINT III 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S GUILT 
WAS OVERWHELMING, HE HAS FAILED TO 
OVERCOME HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXERCISE SOUND 
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO 
ASK QUESTIONS CONCERNING PRIOR FELONY 
CONVICTIONS OF A WITNESS WHO WAS NOT THE 
DEFENDANT, PARTICULARLY WHERE SUCH 
QUESTIONING WAS STIPULATED TO, AND OPENED 
BY APPELLANT'S COUNSEL. 
Appellant complains in Point IV of his brief that 
the prosecutor's cross examination of witness James Miller was 
improper and constituted reversible error. On direct 
examination, appellant's counsel asked Miller where he 
resided, for what crimes he had been convicted, and in what 
year he was convicted (T. 219-220). The witness answered that 
he had been convicted of robbery and kidnapping (T. 220). On 
cross examination, the prosecutor asked the witness what he 
robbed, beginning the following colloquy: 
By Mr. Christensen: What did you rob? 
Mr. Bugden: He is not entitled to ask that question. 
Mr. Christensen: I am if he is, Your Honor. 
Mr. Bugden: He is entitled to ask the nature of the 
conviction, the year of the conviction. 
Mr. Christensen: I move to strike every bit of Mr. 
weaver's testimony. I indicate Mr. 
Bugden has opened the door respecting 
parameters of this. 
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The Court: The Court would overrule the objection. 
(T. 222). The witness continued on to answer that he had 
beaten two persons and had taken their wallets (T. 222). The 
witness later responded concerning the kidnapping conviction 
that he had kidnapped an eleven-year-old child (T. 223). It 
is notable that no objection was made to the questioning about 
the kidnapping until the witness was asked why he committed 
the crime (T. 222-223). Also interesting to note is the 
prosecutor's response to the objection (T. 222). The 
prosecutor moved to strike Weaver's testimony elicited on 
direct examination by appellant's counsel (T. 222). Also, the 
prosecutor indicated that appellant's counsel had opened the 
parameters of the questioning (T. 222). A closer scrutiny of 
the grounds for these comments reveals justification 
overlooked by the appellant. 
An analysis of appellant's counsel's direct 
examination of Weaver shows that the questioning was conducted 
for the sole purpoe of impeaching Weaver's credibility. 
During this examination, appellant's counsel paraded before 
the jury allegations of charges that the witness had no 
knowledge of, or that were dismissed prior to trial (T. 205, 
208). Such improper questioning was allowed to continue 
throughout direct examination, over the state's objection, a~ 
was the object of the prosecutor's response that if 
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appellant was allowed such questioning, he should be afforded 
the same latitude. Further light is shed on this entire issue 
by a colloquy which took place during the last day of trial. 
Mr. Christensen: [A]lso there was an objection that the State 
made. I am trying to recall exactly what 
the wording of it was. Oh, yes, dealing 
with the parameters of cross-examination, 
or direct examination of a witness who 
takes the stand and has been convicted of a 
felony. 
At that time I objected to Mr. Bugden's 
broad latitude and broad questioning and 
going beyond the scope of the statute in 
asking questions that were not relative or 
probative to either impeachment or credi-
bility of the witness, and under the statute 
to avoid embarrassment to a witness. There 
are certain parameters that must be 
governed. 
I believe my objection was based upon Mr. 
Bugden's going beyond that, and that this 
necessitated me to go beyond the parameters 
in cross-examining his witness. As we 
indicated in the side bar, Mr. Bugden may be 
opening the door to broader discovery and 
broader examination than he is entitled to 
under the statute. 
(T. 350-351). After a brief response by appellant's counsel, 
the prosecutor replied: 
Mr. :hristensen: You recall that this is not the side bar 
conference I am talking about. Your Honor, 
I am talking about the one where Mr. Weaver 
was being inquired as to the details of his 
felony offenses, as to the details what had 
taken place, talking about guns and 
possession of the gun. 
At this time I objected to his going beyond 
the scope of the statute in asking those 
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particular questions. And again questions 
came up when he started referring to 
complaints which Mr. Weaver was never even 
convicted with regard to inquiry. 
(T. 352). The court then summarized the essence of the side 
bar conference by stating: 
The Court: 
Mr. Bugden: 
My mind is somewhat hazy on this, but I do 
recall, especially with Mr. Weaver, of 
course, there was somewhat of a discussion, 
and that the State did object to you going 
too far into it. And after the discussion 
we concluded that the Court was of the 
opinion that the examination by the defense 
was going beyond the scope permitted. That 
the State stipulated to it, and I believe 
stated that on the record, the State agreed 
to it. But with the understanding that if 
you did go into it the door would be open, 
and the State could also have the same 
latitude. That is my best recollection. 
Thanks. 
(T. 353) (emphasis added). This summary, accompanied by 
counsel's acquiescence, demonstrates that appellant's counsel 
stipulated to the broad questioning by the prosecutor of 
defense witnesses who had been convicted of felonies. The 
accuracy of the lower court's summary is supported by the 
actual conference and statement as the court recounted (T. 
210). The appellant cannot be heard to complain of the 
parameters of the prosecutor's cross examination which was 
stipulated to by counsel and the subject matter of which was 
opened by appellant's counsel. 
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In the circumstance where the defense counsel has 
opened the matter, or in this case where defense counsel has 
stipulated to the questioning, this Court has ruled that such 
questioning is proper. In State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 337, 489 
p,2d 1191 (Utah 1971), this Court dealt with an allegation of 
error in the questioning of the accused who appeared as a 
witness in his own behalf. The Court noted that defense 
counsel had sought to portray the defendant as a person of 
good character who had been harrassed by the police. 
In doing so he brought out various 
matters in which the defendant had been 
accused of crime. The defendant himself 
having thus opened up the subject, it was 
quite proper for the State to question 
him on matters which might tend to 
challenge, contradict or explain his 
assertions on direct examination. 
489 P.2d at 1193. Similarly, where the appellant had opened 
the subject by in-depth questioning of a State's witness and 
stipulated to similar questioning of defense witnesses, 
appellant's assertions are properly rejected. 
However, should this Court recognize the 
appellant's allegations, they must nevertheless be rejected as 
failing to overcome the burden of proof required for reversal. 
This Court, in State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 
(1936), provided an extensive examination of issues 
surrounding the questioning of witnesses concerning prior 
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felony convictions. This examination resulted in several 
guildelines for future litigants. The Court held that: 
(3) Questions whose only object could be 
to call for answers to affect the 
credibility of the witness and which 
answers would tend to degrade his or her 
character, but not tend to subject the 
witness to punishment for a felony, are 
permissible over a general objection as 
to their relevancy or competency, in the 
sound discretion of the court. 
(5) The discretion referred to in rules 3 
and 4 is to be exercised in view of the 
varying circumstances of each particular 
case and not limited by the intrinsic and 
immediate considerations arising out of 
the cross-examination. 
64 P.2d at 238. The Court noted further that with respect to 
such questions if they were not excluded by the court, they 
are always subject to exclusion by the witness. While not 
conceding that the prosecutor's questions were improper under 
the totality of the circumstances, had they been improper, the 
witness was free to exercise his privilege not to answer. T~ 
appellant simply cannot show the degree of proof necessary to 
overcome the discretionary ruling of the trial court to allow 
the questions in view of the totality of the circumstances, 
particularly where the scope of the questioning was stipulat~ 
to by the appellant. 
Questions concerning the robbery committed by the 
witness were of particular importance to the credibility of 
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the witness. In states which have limited the impeachment of 
witnesses through the use of prior felony convictions, 
involving acts of dishonesty, robbery has been held to be a 
crime of dishonesty admissible for impeachment purposes. 
Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1980). 
It should be remembered that in the present case, 
unlike the cases referred to by the appellant, the questions 
were asked of a witness who was not the defendant. In this 
state, where the details of felony convictions of the 
defendant may be inquired into in unusual circumstances (State 
v. Hansen, 448 P.2d 720, 721 (Utah 1968)), the appellant has 
an even higher burden in showing prejudice resulting from such 
questions posed to a witness who was not the accused. The 
appellant would have this Court believe that the result of the 
prosecutor's cross examination of witness Miller was to 
portray the appellant's witnesses as "bad guys." However, it 
should be noted that defense counsel's direct examination 
established the witness' status as a prisoner. Moreover, 
defense counsel "opened the door" to this type of questioning 
in his examination of weaver and attempting to make Weaver 
appeal'." to be the "bad guy." 
The appellant would also ask this Court to believe 
that a decision in the State's favor would begin a period of 
abuse which would result in the wholesale refusal of persons 
-38-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to appear as witnesses. However, not every case involves the 
unusual circumstance of defense counsel stipulating to and 
opening the door to such questioning. The parameters of 
direct and cross examination would remain as they are under 
the present law since a decision in favor of the State would 
add nothing new. 
POINT IV 
REFERENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS 
CLOSING ARGUMENT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT 
THE VICTIM OF THE ROBBERY COULD HAVE BEEN 
INJURED WAS WITHIN THE PROPER SCOPE OF 
COMMENT WHERE THE JURY COULD PROPERLY 
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF INJURY TO THE 
VICTIM IN REACHING A VERDICT, AND ABSENT 
THE COMMENT, THE VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
THE SAME. 
During the prosecutor's closing arguments he made 
the comment: 
Mr. Christensen: [A] sk yourself whether or not this was 
sufficient to justify an aggravated robbery 
or a simple robbery, or for that matter a 
crime of any kind. 
Ask yourselves what you would have done 
under that set of circumstances. 
Bear in mind also up to what the impact 
would have been had Mr. Cassins Clark 
himself been injured, or other "bitches" 
for victims. 
(T. 361). The appellant alleges error where reference was 
made to the possibility of injury to Mr. Clark, the victim. 
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such a reference was appropriate in a trial where the crime 
charged was that of aggravated robbery by use of a knife or 
facsimile of a knife. The record is replete with references 
to the possible use of knives or a gun in the commission of 
the robbery. The evidence suggests that the appellant had 
possession of a knife only seconds before the robbery occurred 
(T. 22, 277-278). There is also testimony to suggest that the 
existence of a gun was simulated in order to accomplish the 
robbery (T. 25). Moreover, Mr. Clark testified that something 
resembling a short-barreled gun was pointed at him during the 
course of the robbery (T. 80). The abundance of evidence 
concerning the use or apparent use of a deadly weapon in the 
course of the robbery provided a sufficient basis for the 
prosecutor's comment where a significant issue at trial was 
whether the crime committed was aggravated robbery, requiring 
the use of a deadly weapon or facsimile thereof, or simple 
robbery, where no deadly weapon or facsimile is used (see 
u.c.~ § 76-6-302 and u.c.A. § 76-6-301). 
This Court has addressed the issue of alleged 
impropriety in the closing arguments of counsel. In State v. 
Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P. 2d 442 ( 1973), this Court held 
that: 
Counsel for both sides have 
considerable latitude in their arguments 
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to the jury; they have the right to 
discuss fully from their standpoints the 
evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom. The test 
of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. 
513 P.2d at 426. In the present case, the prosecutor 
legitimately inferred from the evidence that some type of 
weapon or facsimile of a deadly weapon was used in the 
robbery. Where such weapons are used in the course of a 
robbery, concern for the safety of the victim is of primary 
concern and forms the basis for the difference in the 
penalties for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and 
simple robbery, a second degree felony. The prosecutor was 
therefore wholly justified in calling the jurors' attention~ 
the concern of potential injury to the victim. However, even 
if no such justification existed for the comment, it does not 
merit reversal in the present case since the jury was in no 
way influenced by the remark. The jury apparently rejected 
the prosecutor's view that a deadly weapon was used since it 
convicted the appellant of only simple robbery (R. 110). 
Therefore, even if this Court were to find error in the 
comment, such error would constitute at most only harmless 
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errnr, having no substantial effect upon the appellant's right 
to a fair trial in that in the absence of the alleged error, 
the result would have been the same. See State v. Kazda, 
Utah, 540 P.2d 949, 951 (1976), and Utah Code Annotated, 
77-35-30. 
In Elston v. State, 321 So.2d 267 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1975), the prosecutor made a comment during closing arguments 
almost identical to that made by the prosecutor in the present 
case. In that case, the prosecutor remarked "[I] submit to 
you ladies and gentlemen of the court that we were lucky no 
one was hurt in the robbery, and the next time that might not 
be true." 321 So.2d at 266. Of this argument, the court 
stated: 
This argument was reasonably calculated 
to call the jury's attention to the 
serious aspect of the robbery and to 
appeal for law enforcement. It was 
within the realm of legitimate appeal to 
the jury. The court's ruling [denying 
the motion for a mistrial], supra, was 
not error. 
321 So.2d at 266. Likewise, in the present case, the trial 
court's ruling that the comment was proper under the crime 
charged was not error (T. 361). 
Even though the appellant makes no showing that the 
prosecutor's remark adversely influenced the jury, and in 
actuality, no such showing can be made, the appellant must be 
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held to this standard. In State v. Galbraith, 559 P.2d 1089 
(Ariz. App. 1977), the court held: "Also, it should be noted 
that the appellant has not made any showing that the remark in 
any manner influenced the jury. Such a showing would be 
required before a reversal would be proper." ,559 P.2d at 
1093. 
The prosecutor's reference in the closing argument 
to the possibility that the victim of the robbery could have 
been injured was within the realm of proper comment under the 
offense charged, and was an expression of his view of the 
evidence. Furthermore, the jury was justified in considering 
such a possibility where the panel was required to decide 
whether a deadly weapon or facsimile of a deadly weapon was 
used in the perpetration of the crime. Moreover, the verdict 
that the appellant was guilty of simple robbery is evidence 
that the comment in no way influenced the jury's decision. 
Consequently, even if the comment was error, it was at most 
harmless error since, in view of the appellant's admission to 
committing the crime, the result of the trial would have been 
the same. 
POINT V 
REFERENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR TO THE FACT 
THAT WITNESS WEAVER STILL HAD 
APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS TO SERVE ON A 
PREVIOUS CONVICTION WAS NOT IMPROPER AS 
PROMULGATING A FALSE IMPRESSION WHERE THE 
COMMENT WAS ACCURATE AND NO PROOF IS 
PRESENTED SHOWING THE STATEMENT'S 
INACCURACY AT THE TIME IT WAS MADE. 
-43-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On October 8, 1980, the State's chief witness in 
the present case appeared before the Board of Pardons for a 
parole violation hearing concerning charges which had been 
dismissed (H.T. 2). During the course of the hearing, 
weaver's counsel, Mr. Steven Hansen, testified that the State 
did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute the charges and 
that since Weaver had cooperated with the State in appellant's 
case and had served three months in the county jail in 
protective custody, revocation of parole was inappropriate 
(H.T. 3, 4). Mr. Hansen also commented, in reliance upon 
communications with prison officials, that Weaver's life would 
be seriously jeopardized should he remain at the prison for an 
extended period of time, that the earliest possible release 
would be advisable (H.T. 4). Prosecutor Christensen also 
testified that Weaver had been the object of many threats 
before and during the appellant's trial (H.T. 6). Mr. 
Christensen pointed out that Weaver was only peripherally 
involved in the events that led to the charges forming the 
basis for the revocation hearing (H.T. 9). The emphasis of 
the hearing then turned to Weaver's safety as a result of his 
testimony against the appellant (H.T. 10, 11). The Board 
dismissed all charges against Weaver and placed him on parole 
after testimony was heard concerning his familiar 
responsibilities and employment prospects (H.T. 14). 
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Appellant assails comments made by the prosecutor 
to the effect that the witness Weaver still had two years to 
serve on a previous conviction. The comment was an attempt to 
buttress the credibility of the witness' testimony as being 
testimony against his own interests. This remark was 
appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case since 
the appellant had vehemently at tacked the witness' credibility 
during cross examination, direct examination, and during 
closing arguments. The propriety of this remark, which was 
never objected to at trial, is further supported by an 
examination of defense counsel's closing argument to the jury, 
Mr. Bugden: Well, just how much time is Weaver doing? Mr. 
Christensen doesn't remind you when he says that 
he is doing his time that all he is doing is 
time for one Class A Misdemeanor. And what was 
he charged with? He was charged with possessi~ 
a firearm, punishable by one to fifteen years in 
the prison. He was charged with possession, or 
theft by receiving, punishable by one to fifteen 
years in prison. But he is pleading guilty to a 
Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by twelve 
months. 
Well, maybe he is doing some time, but hasn't he 
gotten a pretty good deal? He is not going to 
be charged with the robbery that he did. He is 
getting two felonies dismissed and he is only 
going to do twelve months. 
Don't do the crime unless you can do the time. 
Weaver is not doing the time. He got a great 
deal. 
(T. 18). The above passage is only one of many similar 
passages in which defense counsel attacked the credibility of 
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Mr. Weaver. However, this particular passage is especially 
illuminating when compared with the appellant's assertions on 
appeal. The remark assailed by the appellant is found in the 
prosecutor's rebuttal to the closing arguments of defense 
counsel. Since the above-quoted passage is contained in 
defense counsel's closing arguments, it can appropriately be 
said that defense counsel "opened the door" to the 
prosecutor's subsequent remark. Where remarks by defense 
counsel have "opened the door" or invited the remarks of the 
prosecutor, the comments of the prosecutor are not improper. 
This Court, in State v. Boone, Utah, 581 P.2d 571 (1978), 
acknowledged the validity of such a rule when it refused to 
find reversible error in the remarks of the prosecutor 
concerning the defendant's failure to testify. The Court held 
that the remarks were prompted by the comments of defense 
counsel and merely emphasized one of the reasons suggested by 
defense counsel for the defendant's failure to testify. 581 
P.2d at 574. Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court, in the 
case of State v. Hannon, 451 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1969), held that 
"The prosecutor was entitled to discuss the credibility of the 
state's witnesses since the issue had been repeatedly raised 
by defense counsel." 451 P.2d at 604. 
In the present case, any comment by the prosecutor 
concerning the credibility of weaver and the length of his 
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remaining prison terms was a valid issue open to comment. 
Defense counsel had raised the specific issue previous to the 
remarks of the prosecutor, thereby foreclosing any complaint 
of impropriety on appeal. This, and the fact that no 
contemporaneous objection was interposed at the time of the 
comment, absolutely waive the issue for consideration on 
appeal. State v. White, Utah, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (1978). 
Moreover, testimony at trial by numerous witnesses both for 
the State and for the defense had established that Weaver wu 
not liked at the prison and was the object of physical 
assaults and threats because of his cooperation with the 
police. 
The appellant further asserts that because this 
comment was made and Weaver has not in fact served two more 
years in prison, the prosecutor purposely, and in bad faith, 
misled the jurors to attach more credibility of Weaver's 
testimony than they ordinarily would have absent the comment. 
The appellant further asserts that at the time of the closi~ 
argument, the prosecutor either knew or strongly suspected~ 
would do everything he could to prevent Weaver from serving 
more time at the prison. A careful examination of the trial 
record demonstrates the appellant's assertion to be 
groundless. During the cross examination of Weaver on the 
first day of trial, the following colloquy was recorded: 
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By Mr. Bugden: Q: You indicated that there is presently a 
commitment for you that results in your 
being placed in the Utah State Prison, 
is that right? 
By Mr. Weaver: A: Yes, 
Q: What was that for? 
A: Possession of a handgun and theft by 
receiving. 
Q: Now, those charges are still pending 
against you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Theft by receiving? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that is a second-degree felony? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You are also presently charged with 
possession of a firearm? 
A: Yes. 
By Mr. Bugden: Q: Now, you've entered a plea negotiation 
with the State; is that correct? 
By Mr. Weaver: A: Yes. 
Q: You understand that in return for your 
testimony, you are being given the oppor-
tunity to have charges dismissed against 
you; is that correct? 
A: Just to be reduced. 
Q: well, if I understand what Mr. Christensen 
has said, you are going to plead guilty to 
one crime, Class A Misdemeanor? 
A: Yes. 
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(T. at 48-49). The above colloquy demonstrates that at the 
time of the trial, including the closing argument, the only 
arrangements made by way of plea negotiations for Weaver's 
testimony were that he would plead guilty to one Class A 
Misdemeanor instead of being charged and tried for three 
felonies. See also T. 36,37. In the face of this direct 
contradiction to the appellant's assertion, he offers no mo" 
than speculation and conjecture about the prosecutor's 
intention. Such conjecture cannot form the basis of an issue 
cognizable on appeal. There simply is no evidence that the 
prosecutor intended to testify at the parole revocation 
hearing at the time the questioned remark was made during 
closing arguments. 
Moreover, even if the prosecutor at the time of his 
closing argument intended to appear before the Board of 
Pardons and speak in Weaver's behalf, the prosecutor had no 
way of actually securing Weaver's release. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 77-62-3 provides in pertinent part that: 
(a} It shall be the duty of the board of 
pardons to determine by majority 
decision, when and under what conditions, 
subject to the provisions of this act, 
persons now or hereafter serving 
sentences, in all cases except treason or 
impeachments, in the penal or 
correctional institutions of this state, 
may be released upon parole, pardoned, or 
may have their fines or forfeitures 
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remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated; provided, no fine or 
forfeiture shall be remitted, no parole 
or pardon granted, or commutation or 
sentence terminated, except after a full 
hearing before said board. 
under this statute, the Board of Pardons has exclusive 
Jurisdiction to grant sentence terminations, and such 
terminations may be granted only after a hearing has been held 
before the Board. In the present case, the testimony of the 
prosecutor before the Board can be viewed as nothing more than 
a recommendation. Such recommendations are by no means 
binding on the Board. In this situation, the appellant is 
hard-pressed to suggest that the Board decided in favor of 
parole solely on the prosecutor's recommendation. Even if the 
Board's decision rested on the prosecutor's recommendation 
alone, the appellant would still be required to show that the 
prosecutor knew parole would be granted at the time of his 
argument. Such a showing is only a minimum requirement in 
proving the appellant's assertion. This requirement is not 
conceded to be the only demonstration element of an alleged 
improper argument or prejudicial comment. Rather, the 
appellant would be required to show much more before he could 
prevail. However, not even the minimum requirement has been 
me~ in this case. 
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--
Furthermore, this issue raised by the appellant is 
not appropriately before this Court. The practice of 
designating the record of proceedings occurring after the 
trial and conviction, having nothing to do with the appellant, 
is at best of questionable propriety. However, even if the 
record of witness Weaver's parole revocation hearing was 
appropriately before this Court on appeal, any potential 
remedy should have been explored in the lower court by any ooe 
of a number of procedures. Primarily, the appellant could 
have filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 
77-35-24 (1981 Supp.). If such a motion had been found to ~ 
inappropriate, appellant could have filed a petition for an 
extraordinary writ of error coram nobis under Rule 65B(i), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Either of these alternative 
remedies would have placed the matter before the district 
court for decision and consequently preserved the issue for 
appeal to this Court. However, where the appellant has fail~ 
to utilize such remedies, the issue must be viewed as having 
been waived. 
The appellant refers to the case of Walker v. 
State, No. 16705 (Utah, filed January 23, 1981) as supporting 
his position. In that case, the prosecutor was credited with 
the knowledge of evidence, exculpatory to the defendant, as 
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early as the second day of the trial; yet the prosecutor 
thereafter produced two witnesses who testified to that which 
was known to be incorrect. Thereafter, the prosecutor 
deliberately relied upon this incorrect testimony in his 
closing argument to the jury. In reaching its decision, this 
court noted that the State's case against the defendant was 
based on circumstantial evidence which would have been 
contradicted by the new evidence brought to the attention of 
the prosecutor during the second day of trial. The present 
case bears no similarity to Walker. The prosecutor simply had 
no way of knowing before the actual decision of the Board that 
parole would have been granted. Moreover, the case against 
the appellant here was not circumstantial, particularly in 
view of appellant's admission to committing the crime. Simply 
stated, the prosecutor could not have knowingly fostered the 
false impression that Weaver had two more years to serve in 
prison since at the time the comment was made the statement 
was true. 
This Court has addressed the issue of the propriety 
of comments in closing arguments to the jury in State v. 
Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973). There the 
Court concluded that: 
The prosecutor in summing up his case 
before the jury as well as defense 
counsel has wide discretion and is 
entitled to exercise considerable freedom 
in expressing to the jury his view of the 
evidence. 
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514 P.2d at 533. Correspondingly, any ruling made by the 
trial court on an objection interposed to a comment made 
during the closing argument can be disturbed only where it is 
shown that the trial court's discretion has been abused. 
People v. Alvarez, Colo., 530 P.2d 506, 507 (1975). 
The appellant has failed at every turn to overco~ 
his burden of proving an abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial court. He asserts that the prosecutor created a 
false impression in the minds of the jurors when the comment 
which created this allegedly false impression was absolutely 
true. This Court simply cannot consider such groundless 
allegations of error since the entire issue has not been 
preserved for review. 
POINT VI 
IN VIEW OF THE TOTALITY OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT, ANY 
ALLEGED ERROR, OR THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT 
OF SUCH ALLEGED ERRORS, WAS HARMLESS. 
The appellant alleges that errors committed by ~e 
prosecutor continued throughout the trial, relying on his 
previous allegations of error. He asserts that the result of 
these alleged errors was a denial of his right to a fair 
trial. This Court has addressed the issue of fair trial unde 
circumstances similar to the present case. In State v. 
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Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), this Court was 
asked to evaluate the prejudicial effects of a question asked 
by the prosecutor of the defendant. Counsel for the defendant 
objected to the question and the trial court sustained the 
objection. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the error 
was so grievous as to be incurable, and deprived the defendant 
of a fair trial. The Court observed that: 
Nevertheless, the processes of justice 
should not be distorted simply for the 
purpose of censuring a mistake. The 
critical inquiry should be whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the 
incident so prejudiced the jury that in 
its absence there might have been a 
different result. 
517 P.2d at 1324. The Court noted further that the trial 
court, in ruling on a motion for a mistrial, should view such 
episodes in light of the total proceeding to determine whether 
there had been such prejudice as would deprive the defendant 
of an impartial determination of guilt. 517 P.2d at 1324. 
Here, in view of the totality of the proceedings in the trial 
court, the admission of guilt by the appellant, the tape-
if recorded telephone conversation confirming the appellant's 
initiation of the idea to commit the robbery, and the victim's 
:Jer identification of the appellant as one of the robbers, any 
alleged error must have been harmless. 
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Also, in Hodges, this Court noted that it was 
conceivable that reversible error could result from suggestion 
or innuendo, but declined to recognize such a situation since 
that recognition would eliminate the need or incentive for a 
trial court to rule correctly on objections .. This case does 
not present the circumstance postulated by the Court in Hodges 
and therefore provides no reason for accepting appellant's 
allegations. 
Important to note also is the fact that this Court 
in Hodges recognized that: 
In the absence of the appearance of 
something persuasive to the contrary, we 
assume that the jurors were conscientious 
in performing to [sic] their duty, and 
that they followed the instructions of 
the court. 
517 P.2d at 1324. The importance of this presumption in the 
present case lies in the fact that the trial court admonis~d 
the jury that the arguments of counsel were not evidence (T. 
357). The court later instructed the jury on the admission o~ 
evidence and questions to which objections were sustained (R. 
90). The court also instructed that the jury was the finder 
of fact and as such was the exclusive judge of the credibili~ 
of witnesses and weight of the evidence (R. 93-94). The court 
further instructed the jury that the fact that a witness h~ 
been convicted of a felony could be considered only in judgi~ 
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the credibility of a witness and that such a conviction did 
not necessarily impair or destroy credibility (R. 96). 
In view of the entire record of the trial below, if 
this Court observes any error, it must be disregarded. Rule 
61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to 
the court to be inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
See also Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
In the present case, an analysis of the record of 
the proceedings of the court below fails to reveal any 
prejudicial error in the absence of which the result of the 
trial would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant suffered no prejudice from any remark 
made by the prosecutor in either his opening statement or 
closing argument. In the case of the remark made by the 
prosecutor in his opening statement about the statement signed 
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by Weaver exculpating the appellant from criminal 
responsibility, the remark was proper as part of the outline 
of Weaver's testimony. On direct examination, Weaver did in 
fact testify to the incident. Moreover, since no 
contemporaneous objection was interposed by the appellant to 
the remark, the appellant has waived consideration of the 
issue on appeal. 
Appellant's allegation that the trial court 
erroneously denied his motion to withdraw in order to be 
called as a witness, and to call the prosecutor as a defense 
witness, lacks the explanation that is supplied by the 
transcript of the proceedings. Where counsel's motion to 
withdraw was predicated upon his anticipated appearance as a 
witness, and counsel himself decided not to become a witness, 
the question was rendered moot by counsel's own decision. 
Moreover, there was no need for either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor to become witnesses where the opening remark lacked 
any implication of unethical conduct by defense counsel, and 
any evidence surrounding the signing of the statement could 
have been obtained from a number of other persons. 
The reference by the prosecutor during his closing 
argument to the possibility of injury to the victim was pr~~ 
in light of the offense charged, aggravated robbery. It is 
exactly the possibility of injury by use of a deadly weapon 
-57-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that differentiates aggravated robbery from simple robbery, 
making the former a more serious offense. In view of the fact 
that weapons were used, or at least had been obtained for use 
in the robbery, the prosecutor was properly commenting 
according to his view of the case. However, even if the 
comment had been improper, the appellant makes no 
demonstration of prejudice resulting from the remark. In 
fact, no prejudice did result from the comment since the jury 
obviously rejected the prosecutor's view and convicted the 
appellant of simple robbery. 
Further comment during closing argument by the 
prosecutor concerning witness Weaver's remaining two-year 
prison term was likewise proper. Simply stated, the comment 
could not have fostered any prejudicial false impression 
since, at the time of the argument, the comment was true. The 
prosecutor had no way of knowing or guaranteeing that Weaver 
would be released one month later. The appel1ant has not 
demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the comment. 
Similarly, even if appellant's allegations of error 
were well founded, each error was harmless in view of the 
totality of the evidence and proceedings. The appellant 
simply has not shown that a fair trial was not conducted. 
Where the court's admonitions and instructions to the jury are 
presumed to have been followed, appellant's right to a fair 
trial was scrupulously protected. 
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DATED this 3rd day of November, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Atw;;;f1r~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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